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Abstract
I defend my arguments in quant-ph/9806002, which have recently been criticized by L. Vaidman
(quant-ph/9811092). I emphasize that the correct usage of the ABL rule applies not to a genuine
counterfactual statement but rather to a conjunction of material conditionals. I argue that the only
kind of valid counterfactual statement one can make using the ABL rule is a “might” counterfactual,
which is not adequate for the attribution of ‘elements of reality’ to a quantum system.
Lev Vaidman (1998) claims that I am “distorting” his assertions (Kastner 1998). He
suggests that I am trying to “find something beyond [these claims],” i.e., about values of
observables or hidden variables, which he has not made. Yet the title of a 1987 paper of
which he is first author is: “How to Ascertain the Values of σx, σy, and σz of a Spin-
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ticle” (Vaidman, Aharonov, and Albert, 1987). Moreover, in that article he refers to other
“curious properties of a quantum system within time intervals between two experiments”
(my italics), as presented by Albert, Aharonov, and D’Amato (1985). The latter paper,
as noted in my article, uses an explicitly bona fide (in my sense) counterfactual reading
of the ABL rule to support the claim that an appropriately pre- and post-selected system
could have “definite, dispersion-free values” of non-commuting sets of observables. These
claims about dispersion-free values of observables and curious properties of a system be-
tween measurements are certainly ontological claims, and I believe I am fully justified
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in treating them as such in my paper. (However, it should be noted that none of the
arguments in my paper rely on a hidden variables interpretation of quantum mechanics,
i.e., a modal interpretation such as Bohm’s.)
In any case, Vaidman’s claim that what I identify as the non-counterfactual reading of
the ABL rule—my “first reading”—is in fact counterfactual, cannot be maintained. Here
is the syntactical form of that reading:
(If P1 then Q1) and (if P2 then Q2) and (if P3 then Q3) and (if....) and (if PN then QN),
where each Pi is “A measurement of observable i was performed”, and each Qi is “the
probability of outcome xi was p(xi).”
This is clearly and unambiguously a conjunction of material conditionals, not a coun-
terfactual statement. Applying this to a measurement context, if only one of the N
observables—say observable k—is measured, then only one of the material conditionals
has a true antecedent; all the others have false antecedents and are only vacuously true.
As Mermin (1997) says in regard to a list of possible outcomes obtained from the ABL
rule for a time-symmetrized system, the outcomes on the list corresponding to conjuncts
with false antecedents are “rubbish–they have nothing to do with anything.”1
Nevertheless, Vaidman wishes to call the other outcomes “elements of reality,” so he
evidently does not consider them rubbish. The argument apparently is that, by “fixing”
the system’s two-state vector, the other conjuncts can be considered applicable to the
same system. However, the only way it can make any sense to “hold fixed” the system’s
states at t1 and t2 is to talk about some other possible (i.e., non-actual) world j in which
the counterfactual measurement is performed and the system happens to end up with the
same two-state vector as in i. But then all we are saying is that there is some possible
antecedent-world in which the system has the same two-state vector; we can make no
claim that the two-state vector is fixed for all the closest possible antecedent-worlds, as
1Mermin (1997, p. 151).
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In this case, the only kind of counterfactual statement one can make is a “might”
counterfactual rather than a “would” counterfactual. This is a statement like
If I were to strike this match, it might light.
For the ‘might’ counterfactual, it is not required that the necessary background con-
ditions hold throughout the closest antecedent-permitting sphere, but merely at some
possible world in the closest antecedent-permitting sphere. But this, of course, is a much
weaker, essentially empty counterfactual. Outcomes obtained from such a ‘might’ coun-
terfactual would not merit the term “elements of reality”; the most one could say is that
they are “elements of possibility.”3
Finally, I would note that Vaidman’s “...most convincing example that the term counter-
factual is appropriate”, referring to an example discussed in his (1997), was also discussed,
but rather differently, in his (1996). In that paper, he notes (p.903) that “we cannot see
this ‘reality’ for one particle because the uncertainty of the appropriate weak measure-
ment has to be much larger than 1...”, but in his reply (1998) and in his (1997) he seems
to suggest that the weak-measurement elements of reality apply to a single particle. This
point is exactly what is under dispute.
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2That is, unless we arbitrarily designate all worlds with the required two-state vector as consituting all the closest
antecedent-worlds. (Vaidman has indicated in a private correspondence that this is in fact what he has in mind.) But, to
borrow a term from Bennett, this is certainly “ad hoc gerrymandering” (1984, p. 62). Similarity of worlds is properly based
on comparative possibility, not the accidental similarity of individual facts such as having the same two-state vector; this is
not classical dogma but a very general and intuitive way to understand similarity of possible worlds. (See Lewis 1973, e.g.
p. 52). Finkelstein (1998) also does not consider the antecedent-worlds in which the system has the same outcome at t2 as
in the actual world to be closer to the actual world than the antecedent-worlds in which the t2 outcome differs. Moreover,
Kvart’s analysis of cotenability as requiring a lack of negative causal relevance between the antecedent and background
conditions supports my assertion that “fixing” the two-state vector in order to obtain a “would” counterfactual violates
cotenability (see Kvart 1986, e.g. p.xii).
3This notion of “element of possibility”, however, is very weak. For instance, it would appear to have no special
significance as regards to dispositional properties of a system.
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